Consciousness: fundamental to reality? | Philip Goff
Audio Brief
Show transcript
Can fundamental particles actually have incredibly simple forms of experience, or does that idea clash with the highly successful predictions of the Standard Model of physics? Philosopher Philip Goff tackles this debate. In this episode, Goff defends the theory of panpsychism against critiques from theoretical physicists Sabine Hossenfelder and Sean Carroll. You will learn how using the distinction between what matter does and what matter is can bridge the conceptual gap between objective physical measurements and subjective experience.
Physicist Sabine Hossenfelder argues that if particles have extra, non physical consciousness properties, it would clash with the highly successful predictions of the Standard Model of physics.
We can resolve this clash with Russellian panpsychism. Russellian panpsychism proposes that consciousness is not an extra property added on top of mass or charge, but is actually the intrinsic nature of those physical properties. Under this view, the basic building blocks of reality have incredibly simple forms of experience.
Science is excellent at describing behavior, but it cannot tell us what matter actually is in itself. Physics is a science of doing that explains how stuff interacts, leaving a conceptual hole regarding intrinsic identity. This metaphysical gap is called quidditism, and panpsychism fills it by proposing that the inner identity of matter is consciousness.
To evaluate theories of consciousness, remember the difference between what matter does and what matter is. Physical science describes the objective relations of the world, but consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter.
Episode Overview
- Philosopher Philip Goff discusses the concept of panpsychism, defending it against critiques from theoretical physicists Sabine Hossenfelder and Sean Carroll by exploring Russellian panpsychism.
- The talk frames panpsychism not as a dualist addition of consciousness properties to physical particles, but as the intrinsic nature of physical properties like mass, spin, and charge.
- This episode is highly relevant to individuals interested in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness, and how fundamental physics intersects with subjective experience.
Key Concepts
- Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, meaning the basic building blocks of reality have incredibly simple forms of experience.
- Sabine Hossenfelder's critique argues that if particles had non-physical consciousness properties, it would clash with the highly successful predictions of the Standard Model of physics.
- Russellian panpsychism resolves this critique by proposing that consciousness is not an extra property on top of physical properties, but rather the intrinsic nature of those properties (like mass and charge) themselves.
- Physics is a science of doing that describes how matter behaves and interacts, but it remains silent on the intrinsic nature of what matter actually is in itself.
- Quidditism is the metaphysical view that the nature of mass or matter is distinct from its behavior, leaving a conceptual hole in our scientific story that Russellian panpsychism fills with consciousness.
Quotes
- At 2:19 - "Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world." - defining the core philosophical position being defended in the talk.
- At 4:36 - "The view of the Russellian panpsychist is that the physical properties of mass, spin, and charge are forms of consciousness." - clarifying a major misconception about how panpsychism relates to physical properties.
- At 4:57 - "Physics tells you less than you might have thought about the nature of reality... it's really all about what stuff does." - highlighting the limitation of physical sciences in describing the intrinsic nature of matter.
Takeaways
- Evaluate theories of consciousness by distinguishing between dualist frameworks (adding consciousness to matter) and monist frameworks like Russellian panpsychism (identifying matter's intrinsic nature as consciousness).
- Recognize the limits of physical science as a description of behavior and relations rather than intrinsic identity when discussing the hard problem of consciousness.
- Use the distinction between what matter does and what matter is to bridge the conceptual gap between objective physical measurements and subjective experience.