How Ukraine and Russia Fight in 2026 - Battlefield Dynamics with Dmytro Putiata & Rob Lee

Episode Overview

• This episode explores the realities of modern warfare on the Ukrainian frontline in 2026, illustrating how massive drone saturation and severe manpower shortages have fundamentally rewritten traditional military doctrine.
• The discussion traces the shift from continuous, heavily manned trench lines to a decentralized network of sparse, isolated infantry pockets that rely on unmanned systems to survive and hold ground.
• Listeners will understand the logistical adaptations required when conventional vehicles cannot access the front, including the rise of heavy supply drones, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and localized mesh networks.
• This content is critical for military professionals, defense analysts, and anyone seeking to understand why high-tech Western weapons struggle against electronic warfare, and how physical resilience still dictates battlefield survival.

Key Concepts

• The Porous but Robust Frontline: Due to severe manpower shortages and extreme drone threats, the modern frontline has extremely low troop density. Rather than continuous trenches, small infantry clusters of two to four soldiers hold isolated positions in tree lines, ruined buildings, or basements. This layout is structurally porous, allowing Russian infiltration, but highly resilient because bypassed pockets do not automatically retreat; they continue to fight as long as they can be sustained.
• The Evolution of Small-Unit Infantry Tactics: Traditional defensive doctrines emphasizing interlocking fields of fire have become obsolete. Because open terrain is entirely monitored by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), infantry positions act primarily as hidden sensor networks rather than active defensive barriers. Soldiers are often ordered to prioritize concealment over engagement to avoid exposing their positions to deadly precision drone strikes.
• Drone-Based Logistical Adaptation and Survivability: Heavy drone surveillance and tactical interdiction make traditional ground-vehicle resupply and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) near the frontline impossible. To survive, Ukrainian forces have transitioned to a layered, unmanned logistics system. Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) transport heavy loads to forward bases, while heavy rotary-wing "bomber" drones (like the "Baba Yaga" hexacopters) fly supplies directly to isolated outposts.
• Modern Combined Arms Integration: Modern combined arms is not about replacing traditional hardware with drones, but rather integrating the two in a symbiotic relationship. Drone observation makes conventional artillery highly efficient, drastically reducing the ammunition needed to hit a target. Conversely, artillery suppression is required to force enemy infantry into cover, preventing them from shooting down friendly drones with small arms.
• The Electronic Warfare Arms Race: The dependence on commercial satellite internet (specifically Starlink) for drone command and control has triggered a massive Russian electronic warfare (EW) counter-effort using multi-dish jamming systems like the Kupol-Garant. In response, both sides are pivoting away from space-based assets toward localized mesh networks and drone-to-drone radio relays to maintain control signals.
• The Survivability Dilemma (Self-Propelled vs. Towed Artillery): While Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs) offer excellent tactical mobility to "shoot-and-scoot," their complex hydraulic, electronic, and transmission components make them highly vulnerable to single-point mechanical failures and maintenance bottlenecks. In contrast, older, heavily protected, or deeply dug-in towed artillery pieces lack mobility but possess high structural durability, surviving near-misses and being easily repaired in the field.

Quotes

• At 0:06:43 - "Are infantry positions observation posts or are they actually infantry positions? Because in some cases infantry are told deliberately, 'do not engage Russian soldiers unless you have to' ... because otherwise you'll kind of expose yourself to UAVs." - Rob Lee, explaining how drone surveillance has inverted traditional defensive doctrine, forcing infantry to prioritize concealment over active defense.
• At 0:10:12 - "Ukraine doesn't want to fight in this way we are fighting... No one is interested in having three or four guys in a basement for six months... but the point is we are forced to, unfortunately, fight like that." - Dmytro Putiata, highlighting that highly dispersed, basement-centric defense is a product of necessity due to manpower shortages and extreme drone threats rather than preferred doctrine.
• At 0:19:18 - "As long as you hold your forward positions, as long as you can resupply them, you can sustain that [infiltration]. And then you can try and prevent, clear out kind of Russian infiltration groups themselves." - Rob Lee, explaining how unmanned logistics enable Ukrainian pocket defenses to hold out even when Russian forces filter past them.
• At 0:28:28 - "Normally that's something that might be happening by email or Signal in the background, but I recently had the opportunity for an almost three-hour back-and-forth with two people who've probably seen more of the Ukrainian frontline than a lot of Western analysts." - Michael Kofman, emphasizing that the tactical realities described are derived directly from active practitioners on the ground rather than abstract theoretical models.
• At 0:31:13 - "The Ukrainian frontline can't be that dense. It needs to be relatively porous for these kind of infiltration tactics to find a way to make it through, but at the same time, the Ukrainian frontline needs to be relatively resilient. Because what this pattern seems to suggest is that even when the Russians are able to infiltrate past forward Ukrainian positions, that doesn't automatically mean those forward Ukrainian positions fold." - Michael Kofman, explaining the unique structural dynamic of the 2026 frontline, where low troop density allows penetration, but decentralized defensive nodes prevent those penetrations from turning into operational breakthroughs.
• At 0:32:41 - "In some cases, infantry are told deliberately: do not engage Russian soldiers unless you have to... because otherwise, you'll kind of expose yourself to UAVs." - Michael Kofman, illustrating how the omnipresence of aerial surveillance has inverted traditional infantry doctrine, turning firing upon the enemy into a high-risk action that reveals a unit's position to deadly precision strikes.
• At 0:33:41 - "Our concept of defenses is very different... The infantry positions do not have interlocking fields of fire, they don't have full observation either... because they rely on drones for observation but also most strike missions." - Michael Kofman, highlighting the transition of infantry from active shooters to passive defensive nodes, where situational awareness and fire support are outsourced entirely to unmanned systems.
• At 0:34:04 - "We are forced to, unfortunately, fight like that, and to be honest, I think that's the only option we can allow to ourselves right now because of lack of manpower." - Dmytro Putiata, explaining that the highly dispersed, small-node defensive posture is not just a technological choice, but a necessary adaptation driven by severe personnel shortages.
• At 0:34:14 - "Only in combination will you see how artillery and drones are efficient... Because drones give you the observation and reconnaissance. With observation, artillery will fire much less shells... to hit a target." - Dmytro Putiata, describing the symbiotic relationship between drone-based spotters and traditional artillery, which drastically reduces the ammunition required to destroy a target.
• At 0:37:31 - "By using combined arms, if the adversary wants to mitigate any one of those weapons, they have to make themselves vulnerable to a different one." - Rob Lee, defining the classic concept of combined arms in the modern drone era—forcing the enemy into a dilemma where hiding from drones exposes them to artillery, and vice versa.
• At 0:37:37 - "The Russians... improved their employment of UAS in 2025, catching up to Ukraine... narrowing the gap that was kind of significant." - Michael Kofman, identifying a key operational shift where the technological and tactical superiority Ukraine enjoyed in drone warfare has normalized as Russia scaled its own drone integration and electronic warfare capabilities.
• At 0:40:04 - "You now had fields and fields of mine so deep that a single UR-77 (Meteorit), for example, wouldn't be enough to blow a lane... you'd have to get your clearing equipment halfway through the minefield, fire off another charge to cut another lane, and eventually move your way through." - Michael Kofman, describing the physical reality of the massive Russian defensive belts, explaining why large-scale armored maneuvers became mathematically impossible without sustaining catastrophic losses.
• At 0:44:04 - "Only in combination will you see how artillery and drones are efficient... because only in this kind of combination when artillery can suppress the enemy's crew... drones will literally destroy the shelters." - Dmytro Putiata, defining the modern realization of combined arms, showing how traditional suppression weapons and modern precision drones must work in tandem to defeat fortified positions.
• At 0:52:43 - "The best way is to suppress or destroy with artillery and drones... FPVs can be jammed, shot down, or you just miss... you don't have the generosity to send 20 FPVs just to destroy one position." - Dmytro Putiata, explaining that FPV drones cannot entirely replace artillery due to electronic warfare, weather limitations, and cost-efficiency at scale.

Takeaways

• Shift defensive planning away from continuous trench networks toward highly concealed, decentralized small-group nodes (2-4 soldiers) that act as sensor outposts rather than static defensive barriers.
• Implement a tiered, unmanned logistics network using UGVs for ground transport and heavy rotary-wing drones for aerial resupply to sustain isolated, bypassed front-line positions.
• Adapt casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) training and expectations to account for a delayed 6-12 hour timeline, utilizing hybrid gas-electric UGVs to safely extract wounded personnel from drone-active "red zones."
• Design electronic warfare defenses and command structures to incorporate localized radio mesh networks and drone-to-drone relays to preserve communications when satellite links like Starlink are jammed.
• Maintain a balanced artillery fleet of both highly mobile Self-Propelled Guns for "shoot-and-scoot" missions and structurally rugged, easily repaired towed artillery pieces that can survive near-misses.
• Integrate drone surveillance directly with artillery fire support to minimize ammunition consumption and force enemy infantry into shelters, rendering them vulnerable to precision loitering munition strikes.